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In my haste, I swept off the manuscript, the pages scattered, I would never be able to collect 
them in order again. And even if I did, there would be no real order; some gaps, some 
obstacles, some X’s would remain. 
Yevgeny Zamyatin, We  
 
Abstract 
Twentieth century dystopian fictions such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 
(1932), Katherine Burdekin’s Swastika Night (1937), George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949) and John Wyndham’s The Chrysalids (1955) strongly adhere to a 
generic convention by which they project forwards into a narrated future in order to 
look back critically towards the present. In the course of this focus on the past, such 
dystopias include slivers of contested and incomplete accounts of how the dystopian 
state came to exist. I term these fragmentary narratives future histories. Such accounts 
exist within a timeframe that runs from the authorial present to the point in the future 
at which the main narrative is set. In Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, for example, this 
period covers the years from 1949 (the publication date) to 1984, in which the main 
story occurs. I term the timeframe between the authorial present and the future 
temporal setting of the main story world the future-as-past. This article explores the 
development of the complex temporality of dystopian fiction from the early to mid-
twentieth century. Discussion focuses on the manner in which the fragmented future-
as-past is employed critically in relation to the story world and to historical reality. 
The article concludes that by providing scattered hints from which further information 
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could be deduced or inferred, often but not always with the help of contextual 
knowledge, this temporal narrative strategy invites the reader to actively participate 
and politically engage in the reconstruction of future histories. Such future histories 
can never be completed or fully mapped as dystopian fictions are usually less 
specifically predictive than they at first appear. 
Keywords temporality, genre, political fiction, the state, the reader 
 
Introduction: Developing dystopian temporalities 
The plots of dystopian fictions from the mid-twentieth century such as Huxley’s Brave New 
World (1932), Katherine Burdekin’s Swastika Night (1937), Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
(1949) and John Wyndham’s The Chrysalids (1955), strongly adhere to generic 
conventions.1 Several scholars have mapped the similarities that many of the settings of 
such novels share, such as Sargent (1994) and Kumar (1987). Others, including Moylan 
(2000), have highlighted some of their shared thematic concerns, for example with history. 
Here, I concentrate on the question of narrative structure, which has been less well 
explored. 
 The writers I discuss here all demonstrate awareness of writing into the genre. A 
frequent means by way this awareness is signalled is through direct or indirect references to 
other writers associated with the utopian/dystopian tradition.  Thus in Huxley’s Brave New 
                                                      
1 The development of the dystopian genre was first charted in works such as Kingsley Amis New Maps of 
Hell (1975 [1960]), Chad Walsh, From Utopia to Nightmare (1962) and Mark Hillegas, The Future As 
Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the Anti-Utopians (1967). As Fitting (2010) notes, such works displayed 
“a tendency to conflate anti-utopia and dystopia, describing science fiction as predominantly 
pessimistic” (141). While Krishnan Kumar (1987) still used the term “anti-utopia” rather than 
“dystopia”, attempts at more precise and usable definitions are developed in Lyman Tower Sargent 
(1994) (and see also Sargent (2010)), who concentrates on ideational content rather than form or 
narrative. Further important work on definitions and development can be found in Keith M. Booker 
(1994); Fredric Jameson (1994) and (2005); Tom Moylan (2000); Philip E. Wegner (2002); and 
Gregory Claeys (2010). In addition there are several useful chapters in the Moylan and Baccolini (eds) 
volume Dark Horizons (2003) including (but not limited to) those by Darko Suvin (187-201), Peter 
Fitting (155-166), and Philip E. Wegner (167-185). Another recent intervention of note is the volume 
edited by Eckart Voigts and Alessandra Boller (2015). 
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World, for example, Fanny Crowne informs her friend Lenina, “I’ve been feeling rather out 
of sorts lately […] Dr. Wells advised me to have a Pregnancy Substitute” (2005: 44). 
Alternatively, we may only learn of this intended interaction through comments elsewhere 
in their work or in personal correspondence.2 
 We also see generic influence at work at the structural levels of the plots of these 
novels, however. Hence, as Moylan has noted, dystopian fictions typically open in medias 
res in a future setting, and tell the story of a character or small group of characters 
becoming alienated from an existing state of affairs and rebelling against it (2000: 148). 
Their relative conventionality in generic terms allows dystopias to engage with a number of 
inter-related themes. Such fictions have been used to explore issues across science, politics, 
economics, and philosophy, which range from the viability of liberal humanism in an age 
characterised by industrial warfare and Social Darwinism to mass production and moral 
autonomy under the expanding reach of the state into the life of the individual. Dystopian 
fictions typically project their treatment of these issues forwards into a narrated future in 
order to look back critically toward the (authorial) present in fragments littered throughout 
the story. Through this narratological manoeuvre they present contested, ironic accounts of 
how the prospective dystopian state came to be. These fragmented narratives of how the 
prospective dystopian state came to be may be termed future history. Concomitantly, the 
temporality of the period between the authorial present and the future fictional world (i.e. 
the period within which future history lies) may be referred to as the future-as-past. Thus in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eight-Four, the years between 1949 (when the novel was 
                                                      
2 Thus Orwell discusses Zamyatin’s We in Orwell (1998, vol. 16, 99) (and see also the recollection of his 
correspondent Gleb Struve [1971: 50]). The fact that Orwell sent a copy of Nineteen Eighty-Four to 
Aldous Huxley on its publication suggests he was conscious of some similarities with Brave New 
World. Likewise, in an article written the year before he published The Chrysalids, John Wyndham 
called Burdekin’s novel “remarkably perceptive” (1954). 
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published) and 1984 (when the action is principally set) form the future-as-past. Specific 
events within the timeframe 1949-1984 comprise points of future history.  
 In this essay I explore the development of the complex temporality of dystopian 
fiction from the early to mid-twentieth century. The novelty of my approach lies in my 
concern for how narrative structure is generative of the political content of these novels. I 
pay especially close attention to the manner in which the fragmented future-as-past is 
employed critically in relation to the story world and to historical reality. The significance 
of this approach is further underlined in the comparison of well-known texts such as 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’s Brave New World, with novels including John 
Wyndham’s The Chrysalids that have received scant critical attention. While the future 
histories of these novels can be suggestive, they are never complete. Through contextual 
knowledge the reader may fill in some of the gaps and omissions, but many others require 
guesswork, which draws the reader into creative reconstruction of the future-as-past. As 
with imperfect re-ordering of “scattered pages” which Zamyatin’s character D-503 attempts 
in the epigraph above, such reconstructions remain provisional and flawed. Hence, in this 
task (to borrow from Zamyatin), “some obstacles, some gaps, some X’s… remain.”3 
 An early and important example of a dystopian future-as-past that is littered with 
obstacles and gaps that disrupt the reader’s ability to reconstruct a narrative of future-
history is E. M. Forster’s short story “The Machine Stops” (1909). Not only is Forster’s 
story an “early example of the dystopian maps of social hells” (Moylan 2000: 112) of the 
twentieth century, it is one of the first dystopias to exploit the fragmentation of future 
history for the purpose of drawing the reader into creative re-construction of the past. 
Vashti, the story’s protagonist, is citizen of a far-future fully automated world. She lives in 
                                                      
3 There are a variety of translations available of Zamyatin’s We, including several published more recently 
than Mirra Ginsburg’s edition, which I quote. However, as I also refer to Ginsburg’s translations of 
Zamyatin’s essays in this article, for the sake of consistency I use her translation of We too. 
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a beehive-like cell underground, one node of the worldwide living infrastructure “system” 
known as “the machine,” which ordinarily sees to her every want and need, from nutrition 
to communication.  Forster’s story is highly satiric, and allusions to the future-as-past often 
serve comedic purposes in which such historical periods, which lie between the authorial 
present and the time in which the story is principally set, are juxtaposed with this age of 
“the machine”. Hence, we learn that Vashti, 
 
had studied the civilization that had immediately preceded her own – 
the civilization that had mistaken the functions of the system, and had 
used it for bringing people to things, instead of for bringing things to 
people. Those funny old days, when men went for change of air instead 
of changing the air in their rooms! (1954: 115) 
 
The “old days” here lie in the future-as-past, and the specific content (going for a “change 
of air”) is an example of a small detail of “future history.” The effect of this detail is to 
estrange the future storyworld of “the machine.” In the process of estrangement, a social 
element of Vashti’s society is revealed and satirised through comparison to a historical past 
(the future-as-past) in which “the system” did the bidding of men who were still 
independent of the machine. In Vashti’s present, humans are wholly reliant on the machine 
for the basic necessities of life, and as Moylan notes, Vashti is a “perfectly constructed 
subject of [this] automated society”:  toothless, hairless, and conditioned into both 
agoraphobia and pseudo-religious reverence for the machine (2000: 113). 
 As an exemplary subject of this automated society, Vashti’s occupation is typical: she 
is a historian (of sorts) who broadcasts her work in 10-minute lectures to friends in similar 
cells around the world. Importantly, as she never leaves her cell she never meets those she 
 6 
 
lectures to face-to-face, and her knowledge of the past is likewise far removed from any 
direct empirical observation. Consequently, the snippets of opinion that Vashti reports as 
historical knowledge are laughably inaccurate and inane. But just as she spurns direct 
observation and empirically grounded knowledge in her study of the past, Vashti also 
carefully avoids direct experience of the outside world above ground in her daily life. The 
farcical orthodoxy of the age of “the machine” is later expressed in a lecture thus: 
“First-hand ideas do not really exist. They are but the physical impressions produced by life 
and fear, and on this gross foundation who could erect a philosophy? Let your ideas be 
second-hand, and if possible tenth-hand, for then they will be far removed from that 
disturbing element – direct observation” (135). In the age of automation, there is a sort of 
economy of ideas, which are bartered and exchanged as the only thing humans still produce. 
But the most valued of such “ideas” are in reality merely re-readings and syntheses of ideas 
of the past: without direct experience this society produces no new knowledge. The past is 
therefore not valued as an object of study in itself, but only in how narratives about the past 
can be used to reinforce the hegemonic ideology of the present. Just as her agoraphobia 
makes Vashti scared of direct observation of the world beyond her walls, direct evidence of 
a past society that lived in plain sight of the sky would be “disturbing” to her worldview. 
Hence, when Vashti’s son Kuno contacts her and asks her to travel across the globe to visit 
him by airship, in Forster’s schema the trip represents a link to the past because it involves 
direct experience of the world beyond the cell she inhabits. 
 The intellectual poverty of this turn away from direct experience for study of the past 
and understanding of the present alike is demonstrated in an ironic event during Vashti’s 
voyage via airship to see her son: “In the evening she looked again. They were crossing a 
golden sea, in which lay many small islands and one peninsula. She repeated, ‘No ideas 
here,’ and hid Greece behind a metal blind” (122). For all that Vashti claims to study the 
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past through secondary works, her rejection of empirical evidence serves to indicate that, 
ironically, she in fact knows very little about it. Forster here sets a trend that will become a 
generic convention for dystopian fiction, in which principal characters are obsessed with 
historical periods about which they know very little and lack both the skills and empirical 
evidence necessary to discover anything further. 
 As I shall show below, the loss of memory and history is a recurring theme in the 
development of dystopian fiction and the future history at which Forster frequently hints is 
full of uncertainties. For example, Vashti gives a lecture on historical “Australian music” in 
which she “describe[s] the great outburst of song that followed the Chinese conquest” 
(113), but the reader gleans no more details about either the music or this conquest, and the 
subject is never mentioned again. All that the reader knows for sure is that the domination 
of The Machine is a consequence of over-mechanisation at some point in the future-as-past. 
Forster’s story establishes the importance of unrecoverable details in the creation of an 
imaginary future; as we shall see, the idea of an unrecoverable past was further developed 
by later dystopian fiction. 
 
Dystopian Temporality and H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine 
A central contention of my argument is that this sort of interest in a (future) past which is 
not fully recoverable is characteristic of twentieth-century dystopian fiction. This is one of 
several structural features that distinguish modern dystopias from utopias. The name 
“dystopia” suggests how closely the two genres are bound together: “dystopia” (from the 
Greek, “bad-place”) is derived as the antonym for “utopia” (a pun on eu-topos, good place, 
and ou-topos, no-place). However, it would be incorrect to deduce from this etymology an 
oversimplified binary opposition between the two terms. Significantly, as a structural 
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characteristic the future-as-past demonstrates that the relationship between utopia and 
dystopia has become more nuanced. 
 A corollary of this development is that the modern dystopian genre can be 
distinguished from previous iterations of this relationship between Utopia and its negative 
or critical “Other.” In making this claim, I draw upon Gregory Claeys in arguing that 
Forster’s short story forms one node of the “dystopian turn” at the turn of the twentieth 
century. As Claeys notes, this “turn” contains echoes of the “barrage of fictional satires” 
that followed the French Revolution roughly a century earlier (2010: 110). But moving 
beyond Claeys, I argue that a distinction between earlier negative utopian literature and 
twentieth-century dystopias can be most clearly seen with regard to specific structural 
concerns with the future-as-past. Perhaps the most important single author to this 
“dystopian turn” is H. G. Wells, whose proto-dystopian “scientific romances” of the fin-de-
siècle (e.g. The Time Machine [1895]; The Island of Doctor Moreau [1896]; When the 
Sleeper Wakes [1899]) achieved wide circulation and a lasting popularity.  
 As his audience grew, Wells became more confident in his predictive abilities and 
more confident that the human race had the ability to overcome the social ills with which 
his scientific romances dealt. For Wells, humankind had the educational, technological and 
scientific means to found a utopian World State over the course of the twentieth century, 
and in Anticipations (1901), Mankind in the Making (1903) and A Modern Utopia (1905) he 
outlined what such a world would look like. Elements of “The Machine Stops” such as 
governance by committee and worship of the Machine may be read as satirising Wells as a 
utopian socialist and technophile. Indeed, in the 1947 introduction to his Collected Short 
Stories Forster claimed that “The Machine Stops is a reaction to one of the earlier heavens 
of H. G. Wells” (1954: 6). Yet other elements in Forster’s story, such as physical 
degeneration, may be seen to borrow from Wells’s proto-dystopian visions rather than his 
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utopias. For example, when we are first introduced to Vashti she is described as a 
“swaddled lump of flesh” (109), comparable to some of the specialized, underground-
dwelling selenite lunar inhabitants of Wells’s The First Men in the Moon (1901). 
 
Forster became one of many authors of dystopian fiction to respond both directly and 
indirectly to H.G. Wells: in Brave New World, for example, the appearance already cited 
above of “Dr. Wells” as a physician recommending a “pregnancy substitute” is one of many 
ways that Wells makes appearances, and as I argue elsewhere, H. G. Wells was an 
important touchstone for John Wyndham’s avowedly “Wellsian” postwar fiction (Stock 
2015). If the future-as-past played an increasingly important role in such authors’ responses 
to Wells, it also became increasingly central to the underlying discussion of social and 
political ideas in their fiction more generally, whether through the voice of a third person 
narrator or as mediated through characters. Thus Yevgeny Zamyatin expressed cautious 
reservations in his admiration for Wells, stating that the latter’s utopian novels and 
scientific romances were “almost exclusively instruments for exposing defects of the 
existing social order, rather than building a picture of a future paradise,” and as such could 
be regarded as “social tracts in the form of novels” (1970: 286). The social and political 
content of Zamyatin’s own dystopian novel, We, is more subtle and ambiguous than Wells’s 
open didacticism. Yet the temporal estrangement of the novel’s storyworld into the 26th 
Century CE similarly attempts to expose current issues in newly Bolshevik Russia and the 
industrial production methods in Western countries alike. As Patrick Parrinder (1973) has 
shown, the direct influence which Wells’s fiction had upon Zamyatin was due not only to 
the latter’s admiration of the former, but also to the fact that he translated and edited both 
the 1919-20 three-volume Russian collected of Wells’s work and the later twelve-volume 
edition (Hutchings 1981-2: 83). 
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 Wells’s utopian politics became a target for satire or criticism in dystopian fiction, 
and yet as Krishan Kumar has suggested, there remains a sense in which twentieth-century 
dystopian fiction became “a case of Wells contra Wells” (1987: 225). But while Kumar is 
concerned only with the political content of imagined societies, I argue that in his scientific 
romances from The Time Machine onwards, Wells showed the power of an imagined future 
to critique the present social reality, a method of critique which would prove invaluable to 
writers of dystopias in structuring the complex chronology of their own fiction.  
 In The Time Machine, the Traveller begins with a brief experiment in which he travels 
forwards in time five and a half hours, during which he sees his housekeeper Mrs. Watchets 
slowly cross the laboratory, although to him “she seemed to shoot across the room like a 
rocket” (Wells, 2005: 18). The Traveller moves begins to accelerate his machine, and “As I 
put on pace, night followed day like the flapping of a black wing,” and he sees “the moon 
spinning swiftly through her quarters from new to full.” Increasing the pace, he sees “huge 
building rise up faint and fair, and pass like dreams. The whole surface of the earth seemed 
changed – melting and flowing under my eyes” (ibid: 19). Finally, he brings the machine to 
halt in the year 802,701 – at which point he meets the Eloi and the Morlocks. After his 
adventures in this future setting he accelerates much further into the future, to around 30 
million years from his own birth, when he watches the slow death of the planet Earth as the 
years flit by in their thousands. The “politicised configuration of social reality” in the 
framing narrative contrasts markedly with these imagined futures (Smith 2012: 87). By 
having the Time Traveller traverse time at multiple speeds, Wells uses the passage of time 
itself as a means of social and political commentary: the Traveller experiences time first at a 
pace at which he can observe seasonal change minute-by-minute, then the rise and fall of 
civilisations, then – moving beyond anything a single human could witness in their own 
lifetime without the aid of a Time Machine -- biological evolution 
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him and then finally at a pace at which even cosmic change is directly observable. This 
passage of time on evolutionary and cosmic scales estranges the reader from 
anthropocentric conceptions of time, while the Time Traveller remains focused on 
anthropologic description of the creatures he encounters, especially how they interact and 
communicate both with himself and with each other. 
 In the Time Traveller’s narrative, the anthropologic descriptions of Eloi and Morlocks 
are firmly linked to the social structures of Wells’s own day: at one point, the Traveller 
states with reference to the Morlocks, “Even now, does not an East-end worker live in such 
artificial conditions as practically to be cut off from the natural surface of the earth?” (2005: 
48) The splitting of Homo sapiens into two new, antagonistic races is based upon an 
exaggeration of late-Victorian economic and social divisions, in which the urban poor of the 
East End “abyss” were viewed as the degenerate “hapless spawn of diseased humanity” in 
George Gissing’s (1889) words, whose lifestyle the pioneering empirical sociologist 
Charles Booth (1889) had compared unfavourably with “savages” (quoted in Chinn 1995: 
120, 128). In The Time Machine, the act of skipping across countless blank years to create a 
new past that belongs to the future serves to underline another feature of late-Victorian 
degeneration anxiety: the failure to comprehend the scale on which evolutionary forces 
operate.4  
 
The future-as-past and future history 
The influence of Wells on later dystopian authors is in this respect slightly paradoxical: 
while his later utopias such as Men Like Gods (1923) often contained exhaustive social 
detail, Wells’s earlier proto-dystopian scientific romances like The Time Machine clearly 
demonstrated that a cogent critique of both a future fictional society and authorial historical 
                                                      
4 Having trained with T.H. Huxley in the mid-1880s, the biologist often known as “Darwin’s bulldog” for 
his ferocity in debates, H. G. Wells understood this issue better than most. 
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reality could be achieved by skipping over time periods and leaving carefully selected 
historical details out of the narrative altogether. Yevgeny Zamyatin, who both admired and 
criticised Wells for his futurological imagination, was especially attuned to the potential of 
such techniques, and further developed them in his novel We. 
  As Parrinder succinctly puts it, “Wells’s concern is with facing the unknown, 
Zamyatin’s, with being the unknown” (1973: 20-21, emphasis in original). In other words, 
if for Wells the challenge is to make man take the difficult stride forward to achieve the 
greatness for which he is destined as a species, then Zamyatin wanted to demonstrate just 
how strange the experience of a “splintered and blinding” reality would be to someone in 
the present. For Zamyatin, Parrinder argues, this is achieved through the defamiliarizing 
effects of modernist experimentations with language. 
 Such experimentations are usefully mapped by Kern, in his discussion of the formal 
techniques by which Zamyatin achieves his “futuristic” language. Zamyatin’s syntax is 
highly idiosyncratic, eliminating many grammatical elements and eschewing lengthy 
sentences containing multiple subordinate clauses. Zamyatin, Kern claims, 
sought to reproduce what he called “thought language” (myslennyi iazyk) – the speed 
language of “pieces, fragments and additions.” The reader is thus given only the 
guidelines to the action: faced with incomplete sentences (aposiopesis), changes of 
construction (anacoluthon) and bare allusions, he is forced to fill the missing links, to 
think, and, in a sense, to create with the author (1988: 120). 
 The combination of future setting and fragmented speech (“But now… Yes, precisely: 
I feel some alien speck in my brain, like the finest eyelash in the eye” [Zamyatin 1999: 32-
33, ellipsis in original]) contributes to the creation of what Victor Shklovsky termed a 
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defamiliarizing effect (1965: 12).5 The fast pace and use of irregular pauses and ellipses 
create sharp contrasts, reinforced by the frequent references to clashing bright colours. 
Characters’ motivations slip between these ellipses and dashes too: the narrator, D-503, 
fails to understand either his own psychic life or that of others (“this is precisely why – 
precisely why I…” [72]) and the plot of We is thereby destabilised and full of unresolvable 
ambiguity. It is impossible to know whether I-330 really ever loves D-503, for instance, or, 
as is hinted more than once, if she is merely using him to gain access to the Integral 
spaceship that she attempts to hijack. 
 To broaden Kern’s argument, these gaps and missing links extend from the level of 
syntax and imagery to details of the plot and characters, the role of the diary in the 
production of the narrative which it itself records, and then finally to the temporal setting of 
the narrative itself within an imagined future. As D-503 gradually loses control over his life 
and his reason fragments, the diarist often finds time to reflect on the process of writing. D-
503’s penchant for addressing his imaginary audience directly (“you, the unknown readers 
to whom the Integral will bring my notes” [10]) has itself a defamiliarizing effect, 
reminding the reader that not only the content of the novel but its premise too is fantastic, 
and thus preventing the “automatism of perception” from developing (Shklovsky 1965: 12-
13). But this technique also draws attention to the artfulness of the diary; D-503 is not only 
an adventure-story writer but a writer experimenting with the process of writing. Zamyatin 
turns the traditional pattern of the “scientific romance” (as Wells termed his early works) on 
its head: instead of someone like Wells’s Time Traveller coming back from the future to the 
                                                      
5  Zamyatin and Shklovsky disagreed politically and it is unlikely that Zamyatin would strive to 
consciously follow Formalist theory, but his prose does widely use techniques with which Shklovsky 
was concerned, such as “wordplay, deliberately roughened rhythm, [and] figures of speech” (Lemon 
and Reis in Shklovsky, 1965: 5). Shklovsky’s review of We condemned Zamyatin’s “one-sided ability” 
and with pointed irony threw Zamyatin’s image of the aeroplane as a symbol of freedom back at him, 
referring to him as a plane that had reached its “ceiling”. (Shklovsky, 1988: 49-50). 
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present to relate future events, D-503 is a writer from the future writing as if his readers are 
from the past (our present). This is why he comments: 
 
I am confident you will understand that it is far more difficult for me to 
write than it has been for any other author in the history of mankind. 
Some wrote for their contemporaries; others for their descendants. But 
no one has ever written for ancestors, or for beings similar to his 
primitive, remote ancestors (23). 
 
While D-503 emphasizes the “ancient” and uncivilised mind-set of his future fictional 
“unknown reader[s]” in his diary, he also comments on the value that his own society places 
on certain artefacts and thinkers from the novel’s real contemporary reader’s time, such as 
the railway timetable and the methods of Frederick Winslow Taylor. For the most part, 
however, the events of the years between the twentieth-century reader’s present and the 
consolidation of the One State are glossed over by off-hand references to the “Two Hundred 
Years’ War.” The reader learns little about this war because D-503 implicitly assumes that 
she is familiar with its official state history and is therefore able to make connections 
between seemingly disparate events. On occasions when he does provide historical details, 
they are no more reliable than his sycophantic descriptions of the One State: when in the 
third entry, for example, he writes that “During the Two Hundred Years’ War, when all the 
roads fell into ruin and were overgrown with grass, it must at first have seemed extremely 
inconvenient to live in cities cut off from one another by green jungles” (1999: 11), he is 
wholly ignorant of the existence of the Mephi, people who live beyond the One State’s 
Green Wall. Only later in the novel when he becomes aware of the existence of the Mephi 
is the full irony of this comment revealed. 
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 These scattered hints invite the reader to participate in creating a future history, then, 
but prevent the reader from ever gaining more than a limited understanding. Nevertheless, 
the investment of the reader in such acts of creation is important both in We and in 
dystopian fiction more widely. The production of future history is a central site of this 
creativity, and one that involves the use of a particular structural manoeuvre tying 
Zamyatin’s We to other dystopian writers from the mid-twentieth century such as those 
discussed below: these fictions project forwards into the future, but within this framework 
they also obliquely look backwards towards the contemporary reader’s own present and 
near-future. In other words, dystopias self-reflexively pose the question “how did humanity 
get here?”   
 
Counterpoint 
A strikingly clear example of this manoeuvre can be found in chapter three of Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World. Here, Huxley uses a technique which he had previously 
explained using the character of novelist Philip Quarles, in the novel Point Counter Point 
(1928). Quarles’s intention in his work, his notebook reads, is to achieve a “musicalization 
[sic] of fiction. Not in the symbolist way, by subordinating sense to sound… But on a large 
scale, in the construction” (1928: 408). This “counterpoint” or “contrapuntal narrative” is a 
sort of narrative montage, in which several scenes take place simultaneously. Each new 
paragraph indicates a shift between different scenes/conversations, but as these shifts do not 
follow a regular pattern, the only way to decipher which character is speaking is through the 
content of their speech. The frequent shifts give the reader only partial, fragmented access 
to each conversation. Yet the juxtaposition of these scenes invites the reader to infer 
additional information, creating a wider and more complex narrative. 
 16 
 
 Thus, on the lawn of the London Hatchery and Conditioning Centre, Mustapha Mond, 
the World Controller, joins the Centre’s Director to give a group of students a history 
lesson. Inside the building meanwhile, a group of alpha and beta workers coming off shift 
are getting changed. In the female dressing room, Lenina Crowne is talking with her friend 
Fanny. Their conversation revolves around fashion, sexual relationships, and in particular 
Henry Foster (whom Lenina is dating) and Bernard Marx (who has asked her to visit a New 
Mexico “Savage Reservation” with him). In the male changing rooms, Henry Foster, 
ignoring Bernard Marx, is talking to the Assistant Predestinator about the “[w]onderfully 
pneumatic” Lenina Crowne, and suggests that he “try” her (Huxley 2005: 49). Bernard 
Marx, who is besotted with Lenina in a most unconventional (and hence socially 
unacceptable) way, fumes silently to himself as he eavesdrops: “‘Talking about her as 
though she were a bit of meat.’ Bernard ground his teeth. ‘Have her here, have her there’” 
(51). Back in the conditioning rooms, the hypnopaedic indoctrination of children continues: 
the ideological orthodoxy of the adults is underscored by the insertion of consumer slogans 
amid the adult conversations. (For the child, this “hypnopaedic” indoctrination continues 
until “at last the child’s mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the 
child’s mind” [36)]. The focalization and scene changes gradually accelerate towards a 
climax in which single lines and half sentences are interpolated: 
 
“It’s an absolute disgrace – that bandolier of mine.” 
 
“Such are the advantages of a really scientific education.” 
 
“The more stitches the less riches; the more stiches the less…” 
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“The introduction of Our Ford’s first T-Model…” 
 
“I’ve had it nearly three months.” 
 
“Chosen as the opening date of the new era” (Huxley 2005: 57). 
 
As Quarles comments in Point Counter Point, “[t]he abrupt transitions are easy enough. All 
you need is a sufficiency of characters and parallel, contrapuntal plots” (Huxley 1928: 408). 
 The plotlines developed in the novel’s third chapter deftly expose the brutal 
foundations of the future World State. The London location provides a clear link to 
Huxley’s present, and points satirically to cultural, scientific and intellectual trends of the 
1930s. Yet the counterpoint technique emphasizes not the social reality of the contemporary 
reader’s present nor the fictional future of the year 632 A. F. (After Ford), but rather the 
near future between these two: the years of the “great Economic Collapse” and anthrax 
bombs, of the “British Museum Massacre” and cultured “simple lifers” reading 
Shakespeare. Whilst almost every sentence is satirical in itself (for instance, “Liberalism, of 
course, was dead of anthrax, but all the same you couldn’t do things by force”), the critical 
force of each statement is multiplied by its juxtaposition with others (the anthrax bombs 
dropped in the Eighth Arrondissement are paired, for instance, with Lenina’s desire to “see 
a Savage Reservation”). 
 
Fragments of the “black amalgam” 
The contrapuntal narrative skips between conversations on different subjects, and 
additionally between discourses, switching frequently and abruptly from the banality of 
sexual gossip to the absurd presentation of an authoritative scientific account of terror by a 
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man who paradoxically claims that the success of the World State is in part due to the 
suppression of any knowledge of, or relation to, the pre-World State past. Huxley gives the 
reader just enough information to piece together an idea of how the World State came into 
being, without laying out a causal or even coherent sequence of events: there are glimpses 
of increasing disorder, war, and economic collapse, yet none of these are fleshed out. We do 
not discover, for example, who the belligerents were in the “Nine Years’ War,” or how the 
use of anthrax against civilians was justified. Huxley guides the reader to fill in blanks 
between snippets of conversation to create a meaning beyond (or more accurately between) 
the words on the page themselves. A history of the period that precedes the temporal setting 
of Brave New World and lies in the contemporary reader’s future is only partially revealed. 
The restricted revelation of Huxley’s dystopia contrasts with the more expansive – and 
frequently utopian – prophecies of contemporary future histories by Wells (such as the final 
chapter of the 1923 edition of An Outline of History, or his The Shape of Things to Come 
[1933]) or Olaf Stapledon (such as his Last and First Men [1934]), as well as earlier pre-
modernist future-set utopias like Bellamy’s Looking Backward 2000-1887 (1887) or 
Morris’s News From Nowhere (1890).  
 In the case of Brave New World, to creatively co-produce a future-history the reader 
needs to be familiar with the historical conditions of the 1930s in which the work was 
produced. Huxley’s novel engages with science and politics at a time of turmoil, and with 
modernist aesthetics and the ascendancy of mass media forms such as the “talkies” during a 
period of far-reaching social and cultural upheaval. Dystopian fiction, in the words of Chris 
Ferns, “posits a society which – however outlandish – is clearly extrapolated from that 
which exists” (1999: 107), and the “black amalgam” of the 1930s, to borrow Raymond 
Williams’ phrase (1979: 60), infects both the themes and plot of Brave New World. 
Mustapha Mond skips between various scenes and events in world history, giving an 
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impression of overwhelming change through a handful of scattered details; events are 
skimmed over so rapidly that the gaps between them seem to blur by. Yet these gaps 
represent important (and missing) processes of historical change, and allow Huxley to play 
with a variety of contemporary social and cultural anxieties. Hence, when Mond tells the 
students that the Nine Years’ War witnessed “fourteen thousand aeroplanes advancing in 
open order” over Paris (Huxley 2005: 53), this both tests the limits of credulity and draws 
upon existing fears of the devastating impact of aerial bombardment in future European 
conflict. Such terror becomes comprehensible (first to the fictional audience of students in 
the story, then to the narrative audience of readers) as just a story – exotic, distant, and 
significant not in terms of its direct consequences but rather in the message that it conveys. 
What appear to readers (though not to characters within the future “storyworld” [Herman 
2009: xvi]) as prophecies of future terrors are hereby consigned to the narrative of history, a 
stable object of knowledge located in the far past. 
 It is instructive to look at just how fragmented Mond’s history lesson is by stripping 
away the voices and information of the other juxtaposed scenes which split up his speech 
over the course of two pages: 
 
“Then the Nine Years’ War began in A.F. 141.” 
… 
“Phosgene, chloropicrin, ethyl iodacetate, diphenylcyanarsine, 
trichlormethyl, chloroformate, dichlorethyl sulphide.  Not to mention 
hydrocyanic acid.” 
… 
* *  * 
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“The noise of fourteen thousand aeroplanes advancing in open order.  
But in the Kurfurstendamm [sic] and the Eighth Arrondissement, the 
explosion of the anthrax bombs is hardly louder than the popping of a 
paper bag.” 
… 
“The Russian technique for infecting water supplies was particularly 
ingenious.” 
… 
“The Nine Years’ War, the great Economic Collapse.  There was a 
choice between World Control and destruction.  Between stability 
and…” 
(Huxley 2005: 52-53). 
 
The listing of chemicals here seems to confer the authority of scientific discourse on a 
historical narrative, but the text undermines any notion that such a history, especially when 
provided by a World Controller, could be more than empty propaganda and ideologically-
charged clichés masking a brutal reality. Furthermore, and as already intimated, an 
awareness of the contents of the “black amalgam” of the 1930s reveals the novel to be 
rather more specifically predictive than it at first appears. Huxley plays on commonly-held 
beliefs of the early 1930s, such as a presumption that civilians would be targeted in 
bombing raids, or the expectation that the chemical and biological weapons which had crept 
into the trenches of World War I would be widely used in future conflict.  
 It is here that the truly black humour of Huxley’s satire emerges. The cheerfulness 
with which Mustapha Mond delivers his lecture minimizes the cost at which the stability of 
the World State was bought: as he physically “whisk[s]” away cultural achievements of the 
 21 
 
past with a wave of the hand (41), he also deliberately underplays the human cost of the 
Nine Years’ War. The interpolated conversations underline the fact that it was precisely 
through the violent deaths of untold millions that the founding of the World State 
eliminated suffering and war and instituted stability and material well-being – the 
“deathlike stasis” that to Adorno “makes [this future] a nightmare” (1967:112). As Adorno 
puts it, “Huxley projects observations of the present state of civilization along the lines of 
its own teleology to the point where its monstrous nature becomes immediately evident” 
(ibid.: 99). As a rhetorical device, Mond’s fragmented lecture reveals that the World State is 
more concerned with the instrumentalized means of science than with the human 
consequences of their use. Indeed, as Adorno again notes, “‘History is Bunk,’ an expression 
attributed to Ford, relegates to the junkpile everything not in line with the most recent 
methods of industrial production, including, ultimately, all continuity of life… The blame 
rests with the substitution of means for all ends” (102). 
 
“The smallest fragment of the truth of history”  
Huxley’s experimentation with a “contrapuntal” method of writing provides a clear 
example of how the play on contemporary anxieties together with the use of elliptical 
references to the future-as-past can combine to help the reader reconstruct a future history. 
However, in Brave New World the status of this historical knowledge may be more 
problematic than it at first appears. Mustapha Mond is teaching history to students who are 
unable “to perceive or think anything unlike themselves” (Adorno 1967: 102), and who 
naïvely assume that the historical narrative he weaves is accurate and unbiased. His 
intellectual equals John Savage and Helmholtz Watson never question his authority, and 
only fragments of Mond’s account are communicated to the reader. The only voice that 
remains able to question the accuracy of Mond’s version of the past is that of the narrator, 
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who remains silent. 
 In contrast to Huxley’s dystopia, Katherine Burdekin’s Swastika Night (1937) is set in 
a far future Nazi empire, where historical knowledge is remarkably unstable. Officially, the 
Nazis have proscribed history and in its place a patriarchal and misogynist religious 
mythical past is ceaselessly proclaimed. Daphne Patai explains that the novel “extrapolates 
from the Romantic and medieval longings of such Nazi ideologues as Alfred Rosenberg”; a 
“cult of masculinity governs life, and sheer ignorance is combined with brutality to form the 
main instruments of control” (1984: 86). To the reader, it is obvious from the first page that 
this “spurious Germanic mythology” (ibid.) is a dangerous and bizarre revision of the 
empirical reality of the future-as-past, when Adolf Hitler is presented as a messiah “not 
begotten, not born, but Exploded!” (1985: 5, emphasis in original). The reader quickly 
learns that the Hitlerian dogma masks a very different reality even within the future in 
which the novel is set: women, who are kept like animals in cages, are exhorted to have 
male babies but for unknown reasons the female birth rate has dropped dangerously low, 
putting the future of the Empire at risk. The subjugation of women in Swastika Night 
becomes all the more terrifying when viewed as an extrapolation from its own historical 
context: Debra Shaw contends that in Hitler’s Germany women had “already begun to 
relinquish any autonomy they might have gained under the Weimar Republic” and were 
consigned to a role “that would cage them within the home and remove their influence 
entirely from public life” (2000: 46). Kate Holden, meanwhile, reads Swastika Night in the 
context of a gendered English culture in which fascist impulses “[formed] part of the 
contradictory forces associated with early 20th century modernity” that writers like Woolf, 
Burdekin and Rhys all “confronted and negotiated” (1999: 143). 
 The role performed by Friedrich von Hess, the Nazi “Knight of Hohenlinden” in the 
context of his own society is somewhere between that of Helmholtz Watson and Mustapha 
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Mond in Huxley’s World State: von Hess is an alpha plus male in a position of patriarchal 
privilege, but while outwardly he dutifully performs the role expected of the Nazi hereditary 
elite, he hides his inward opposition to hegemonic power structures. This opposition is 
based principally on a secret book he holds which was written by his ancestor and which 
purports, imperfectly and partially, to recount a truer history of the past from the time of the 
novel’s contemporary readers (starting with a “Twenty Years War”) up to the point in the 
future-as-past at which, having consolidated their empire, the Nazi leadership chose to 
destroy all traces of pre-Hitler civilization. The thrust of the narrative centres on von Hess, 
who has no living sons of his own, passing on the illicit book to an Englishman named 
Alfred, and his loyal but “slow-brained and bucolic” German lover Hermann (Burdekin 
1985: 18).  
 While Alfred can tell Hermann that there is “a great darkness surrounding our 
origins” (26), he – unlike the rebels of Brave New World – is a properly historical subject. 
The Nazi myth of its own holy origins is central to the hegemonic religious power of the 
Hitlerian Church. Yet simultaneously, the mythic past undermines the divine status of the 
religious empire due to the structural necessity of unknown elements in the religious 
narrative it propagates. From the Nazi point of view, the past must be shrouded in darkness 
to protect the established Church from inquiries into the obvious inconsistencies of its 
doctrine. But the very incompleteness of this narrative leads Alfred to question whether it 
masks a rather different history. Hermann repeats to Alfred the orthodoxy that “Blood is a 
Mystery, and a thing no non-German can understand. It’s ours” (28). This is a wholly 
insufficient explanation for Alfred. 
 Shaw states that Alfred, “by reading a forbidden text, is able to analyse the inherent 
weakness of Nazi rule and to understand the importance of the status of women to the 
possibility of a non-violent revolution” (2000: 43), but Alfred’s consciousness is not raised 
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by the book itself. Rather, his critical awareness prefigures his reading of the book, which 
does not occur until near the novel’s climax. Indeed, by the time he and von Hess discuss 
the history of the Reich, Alfred has already guessed aspects of the history of his own nation. 
Thus, Alfred deduces that an English-speaking empire probably pre-dated the German 
Reich from the existence of English speaking communities around the world, while the 
Empire’s official line is that the English were barbarian before German conquest. Unusually 
for a non-German, as an airplane mechanic Alfred is literate and has studied the Hitler Bible 
“very carefully,” 
 
with a mind unclouded by belief in it as divine. It’s quite obvious that a 
lot of the teaching has been put in later. And even all the Blood stuff, 
you don’t know whether that was Hitler himself or a lot of people. It’s 
an unsatisfactory book. Something wrong somewhere. It leaves you 
empty (29). 
 
Likewise, when the Knight says to him “Women are nothing, except an incarnate desire to 
please men; why should they fail in their nature…?” Alfred replies “There’s something 
wrong somewhere… I don’t know what it is yet. I’ll have to think it out” (82). Alfred’s 
quest is not only to discover what truth he can about the past, but also to establish a set of 
working methods for gathering and interpreting evidence of past civilization. Following this 
conversation, he thinks about the question of women “unsexually and objectively,” 
eventually hitting upon an idea that “had no holes, logically, it was merely quite fantastic 
and impossible” (98). Alfred uses empirical evidence when and where it is available to him, 
but with regard to the question of women there is precious little evidence beyond a 
photograph of the Knight’s showing the real Hitler (not a blond seven-foot god as he is 
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represented by the Empire) with his arm around a beautiful sixteen-year old girl quite unlike 
the shaven-headed, caged women of Alfred’s own day. His theory about the necessity of 
female emancipation for a wider non-violent revolution relies on some educated guesswork, 
and there are many questions that, even with the help of von Hess and the book, he is 
unable to answer. This again prevents the reader from gleaning a comprehensive account of 
the future-as-past. 
 Moreover, most of the reader’s insight into the book’s contents is mediated through 
the Knight. As George McKay points out, “the few odd sentences that are quoted or 
reported from [the von Hess book] tell only of [the writer] Friedrich’s own emotions” 
(1994: 306-7). We learn that Alfred reads the book to his son, but we only learn about its 
contents indirectly through the earlier dialogues between Alfred and the Knight. Indeed, as 
McKay makes clear, while the existence of the book “functions to destabilise subjectivity” 
(1994: 306), it is through these dialogues that Alfred really rediscovers the past. He is an 
able interlocutor for the Knight, who gives him a far more detailed portrait of the future-as-
past than Mustapha Mond gives to his students in Brave New World. However, the mingling 
of confused details from Burdekin’s interwar present with not-quite complete summaries of 
the future history serves to veil some of the most troubling details of the future-as-past. In 
Shaw’s words, “Although the book recounts the destruction of all other historical records 
and charts the beginning of the process which has perpetuated the idea of Hitler as a god 
and the German people as superior to all other races, it is, itself, a mixture of fact and 
conjecture” (2000: 44). 
 The book’s writer is open about his own limitations, inscribing in the front,  “though 
what I have put down here is but the smallest fragment of the truth of history, yet I swear 
that, to my poor knowledge, it is all true.” The Knight further informs Alfred that the writer 
is “always in despair – ‘Here my memory fails me,’ or ‘Here I have alas no further 
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knowledge.’ He was patient and thorough, a good German worker, but he was no scholar’” 
(74, emphasis in original). In contrast to both the unquestioned authority of Mustapha 
Mond’s history in Brave New World, and Vashti’s understanding of the past which is as far 
removed from direct experience as possible in Forster’s story, here history as an object of 
knowledge is destabilised and seen as provisional and inherently problematic. Despite an 
exposition of future history which is more detailed than in many dystopias of the period, the 
future-as-past is veiled both by disinformation and by shortcomings in knowledge. 
Moreover, the book has not been updated with a “true history” of the Empire since the first 
von Hess wrote the original. According to the Knight, his book describes how the Jews 
were “either absorbed into other nations or wiped out,” and details massacres by Germans 
and other Europeans “both during and after the Twenty Years’ War” (148). But “the last 
remnants” of the Jewish people were still alive in the first von Hess’s time, and the current 
Knight states that, “The end of the Jewish tragedy is in the gulf of our darkness” (149).  
 
Forbidden books and the problem of history 
To Patai, the central place accorded to von Hess’s book and the way in which characters 
interact with it is a key means by which Swastika Night anticipates Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. Patai points out that 
 
Winston and Alfred each attempt to teach a lover/ friend (Julia; 
Hermann) about the past by reading from the book, but meet with 
resistance or indifference. In both cases, a curious detail occurs: Julia 
and Hermann sleep while the secret book is read, a mark of their lack of 
interest and intellectual development. (1984: 86) 
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Yet while in Swastika Night the reader encounters the book indirectly through the dialogues 
between Alfred and von Hess, in Nineteen Eighty-Four the situation is reversed: almost 
thirty-four pages are devoted to an extract from the book itself. In keeping with the 
problematizing of the notion of truth throughout Nineteen Eighty-Four, the authorship of 
this text is contested: Winston Smith’s torturer O’Brien later claims to have penned it, but 
there is no way of knowing for sure (Orwell 1989: 274), and while it is he who gives 
Winston the book the reader learns almost nothing about its contents from him. Patai’s 
comparison of “the book” in Swastika Night and Nineteen Eighty-Four can thus be pursued 
a stage further: both fit into a wider convention of constructing and then destabilizing 
historical knowledge within dystopian fiction. 
 While the von Hess book is written with gravity and sincerity as a “faint will-o-the-
wisp light in the darkness” (Burdekin 1985: 74), there is a satirical edge to the heavy 
rhetorical style of The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism, a work of political 
economy supposedly written by Oceania’s arch-enemy-within, Emmanuel Goldstein. 
Notwithstanding this however, the truth claims of Goldstein/O’Brien’s text do seem to 
accord with Winston’s understanding of the past: the book, he reflects, “had not actually 
told him anything he did not know… already” (226). Significantly the focus of the extract is 
not upon the future-as-past, and much of the future history remains unknowable. Instead, it 
offers a very general historical narrative, critically analysing the interwar years (“by the 
fourth decade of the twentieth century all the main currents of political thought were 
authoritarian” [213]), and goes on to describe conditions circa (the fictional future year of) 
1984. Remarkably little space is devoted to the gap between these periods. Although this 
era is alluded to on several occasions (for example, “the ravages of the atomic war of the 
nineteen-fifties have never been fully repaired” [197]), the longest continuous passage on 
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the period is under a page. Even here, references to events in the future-as-past somehow 
slip sideways out of the text: 
 
The earthly paradise had been discredited at exactly the moment 
when it became realisable.  Every new political theory… led 
back to hierarchy and regimentation… tolerated and even 
defended by people who considered themselves enlightened and 
progressive. 
 It was only after a decade of national wars, civil wars, 
revolutions and counter-revolutions in all parts of the world that 
Ingsoc and its rivals emerged as fully worked-out political 
theories. But they had been foreshadowed by the various 
systems, generally called totalitarian, which had appeared 
earlier in the century, and the main outlines of the world which 
would emerge from the prevailing chaos had long been obvious 
(Orwell 1989: 213 emphasis added). 
 
As with Mustapha Mond’s history lesson, the phrase “had long been obvious” is an 
invitation for the reader to draw these outlines for herself or himself. This applies both to 
Winston, reading the text to a dozing Julia within the narrative, and to the reader of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. The book places Winston’s childhood memories within a historical 
context so that he starts to perceive himself as a historical subject. But for everything we 
learn about the exact makeup of the future world of Oceania, there is little beyond the 
ominous reference to “atomic war” to indicate the mechanisms by which the postwar world 
morphed into the world of the year 1984. Elsewhere in the novel, Winston remembers his 
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own deprived childhood as comprising such events as scavenging for food, taking shelter in 
a tube station during an air raid, and stealing his dying sister’s chocolate. There are a few 
references to specific historical events too – including an atomic bomb landing on 
Colchester, one of the oldest towns in Britain. But no more details are given, and the 
mechanics of the link between atomic warfare and the final consolidation of Oceanian 
power are only implied. Much as in Huxley’s Brave New World, then, the details of the near 
future, the precise locations of the ominous threats, are avoided as if taboo. Institutions such 
as Hate Week and the Two Minutes’ Hate demonstrate how submission to the power of the 
Party is now constantly re-inscribed, but the Party’s desire for ever-increasing power does 
not tell us anything about how they were able to gain power and solidify their position in 
the first place. These changes and the question of why they were ultimately successful slide 
into the background as a well-worn list of “national wars, civil wars, revolutions and 
counter-revolutions” underpinning what is, in the eyes of Goldstein/O’Brien, the more 
important business of analyzing the political economy of the present. For all that the reader 
may reconstruct the history of the period from 1948 to 1984 from clues in the text, there are 
points at which the gaps and omissions make full reconstruction impossible. 
 In common with both Brave New World and Swastika Night, there are both contextual 
and structural reasons for this narrative strategy. The language, tone and rhetoric of 
Goldstein’s text suggest that a central target of critique in this section is the American ex-
Trotskyist turned conservative James Burnham.6 In The Managerial Revolution (1940), 
                                                      
6 Orwell addressed Burnham’s work in his journalism on several occasions: in 1944 he used his 
Tribune column to take Burnham to task over the failure of his prophecy in The Managerial Revolution 
and a week later gave The Machiavellians (1943) a terrible review for The Manchester Evening News 
(Orwell, 1998, vol. 16:60-64 and 72-4). Whilst in his essay of October 1945 “You and the Atom 
Bomb” Orwell found some broad and very general truths in Burnham’s argument (ibid. vol. 17:320), 
his longer essay in May 1946 “Second Thoughts on James Burnham” again damned him for his 
“worship of power” and “cowardice” (ibid. vol. 18:268-84, here 278). Yet in his 1947 review of The 
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Burnham argued that a new managerial class already held the global balance of power, and 
would soon become the globally ascendant social class. To Burnham, Marx’s polarization 
of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie into antithetical forces had proved false. Instead, the 
increasing specialization and technological complexity of the twentieth century had led to 
the emergence of a new and powerful social class of managers between capitalist and 
worker. Goldstein/O’Brien calls this class “the new aristocracy,” which 
was made up for the most part of bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, trade-union 
organisers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists and professional 
politicians. These people, whose origins lay in the salaried middle class and the 
upper grades of the working class, had been shaped and brought together by the 
barren world of monopoly industry and centralised government (Orwell 1989: 213). 
 This is precisely the group of technically-skilled professionals that Burnham had 
labelled the “so-called ‘new middle class’” (1962: 55-56). He argued that their ideologies 
were still being worked out, much as the ideologies of capitalism were not fully mapped by 
the early bourgeoisie. As a ruthlessly efficient and organized class, however, their 
ideologies would not be either humanist or democratic; they would be dictatorial and 
aggressive. Goldstein’s text, pursuing Burnham’s logic, likewise argues that from the early 
twentieth century onwards global war has been, and will continue to be, the engine of 
historical change. 
 In Swastika Night it is the Hitler Bible, rather than the von Hess book, which provides 
the account of the transition to the new (dystopian) world order. As Patai indicates, the 
ideas attributed to the central character in the production of the religious myth of Hitler, von 
Wied, 
                                                                                                                                                            
Struggle for the World (1946) Orwell praised Burnham for his “intellectual courage” (ibid. vol. 19:99). 
We may conclude that although he took Burnham seriously, Orwell regarded him as a man whose 
“picture of the world is always slightly distorted” (ibid vol. 19:104). 
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closely resemble those of the pre-fascist Viennese ideologue 
Otto Weininger who, in his 1903 book Sex and Character… 
sees the male principle as active, as form, while the female is 
mere passive matter, a nothingness that needs to be shaped by 
man, hence women's famous submissive 'nature'… Women use 
their sexuality to come into existence, for it is only in sexual 
union that women are given form by men… Weininger 
concludes that fecundity is loathsome and that the education of 
mankind must be taken out of the hands of the mother (1984: 
90, n. 3).  
The replacement of history by a pathological Weiningerian mythology of sexual disgust is a 
process that requires the consent and active participation of the upper echelons of the Nazi 
order at the time of the first von Hess. In seeking to combine the power functions of the 
priestly caste and the imperial state, the Romanticist leanings of Nazis like Rosenberg are 
again foregrounded and the new Nazi society constructed according to a vision of a remote 
mythologized past which denies the persistence of historical change. The result is that, like 
Huxley’s World State and Orwell’s Oceania, the Nazi Empire of Swastika Night strives for 
permanent stasis and the End of History. 
 The attempt by Burdekin’s Nazis to replace history with a fundamentally distorted 
account of the past finally founders, because they fail to prevent the development of a mode 
of thinking in which historical questions can be asked. Their vision adheres to Romanticist 
notions so closely that a properly modern and totalitarian suppression of historical enquiry – 
which would prevent people like Alfred from thinking of asking these sorts of questions in 
 32 
 
the first place – is impossible. Books and churches could easily be burned, and commonly 
were by Nazis and Spanish anarchists respectively at the time Burdekin wrote. But through 
the passing on of cultural heritage, a sense of identity rooted in an historical notion of 
national collectivity persists. This is clearly visible in the widespread knowledge of 
resistance music, for instance. Alfred’s knowledge of forbidden songs is far more extensive 
than Winston Smith’s search for the missing lyrics of “Oranges and Lemons.” In Nineteen 
Eighty-Four the past is ceaselessly altered and re-constructed, so that it becomes impossible 
to cling to fixed concepts of history. The only constant is the mutability of the past. This 
limits the ability of subjects like Winston Smith to form historical questions. As O’Brien 
puts it, “The command of the old despotisms was ‘Thou shalt not’. The command of the 
totalitarians was ‘Thou shalt’. Our command is ‘Thou art’” (Orwell 1989: 267).  In 
Swastika Night, the past is seen through the framework of a mythology that is both 
unalterable and full of inexplicable “mysteries”. The regime hopes that historical enquiry 
will disappear simply through neglect; Alfred and von Hess both give the lie to this hope by 
interrogating the inconsistencies of Nazi mythology. 
 
Mutating Christianity 
Burdekin posits a future centred on historical regression that faintly echoes the evolutionary 
“regression” in Wells’s The Time Machine. This echo of Wells’s regressive future is one of 
several important links between Swastika Night and John Wyndham’s 1955 novel The 
Chrysalids. 
 Wyndham had read Swastika Night, and early drafts of what would become The 
Chrysalids suggest that it exerted an influence upon him, particularly with regard to some 
of the social elements of his imagined society (Wyndham, 1954). The novel’s protagonist-
narrator is a teenager called David who lives in the small, subsistence farming community 
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of Waknuk, Labrador, a thousand years after a nuclear holocaust. Genetic mutation is 
relatively common as a result of the persistence of radiation, and the community wages an 
unrelenting war against it, an obsessive dream in which religious salvation is closely tied to 
the ability to decontaminate one’s whole environment. Mutant livestock and crops are 
destroyed; children born with even a slight deviation from a tightly proscribed norm are 
sterilized and cast out or else killed. David is one of a group of youngsters with a new, 
unseen mutation – he is a telepath. The plot charts the development of these abilities and the 
subsequent persecution of the telepaths until they are eventually rescued by a woman from 
“Sealand” (New Zealand). 
 Central to Wyndham’s dystopian imaginary is an ideal of purity that is latently 
present in the other dystopian texts I have discussed. In The Chrysalids, purity links the 
imposition of theocratic power in a post-apocalyptic future with the imposition of secular 
power by authoritarian and totalitarian governments in the author’s contemporary world. 
Moreover, Waknuk is othered as a dystopic “no-place” by the similarities between the 
authoritarian form of the post-Christian religion practized there and the New England 
Puritanism of the first American settlers in the early modern period.7  
 David’s and his friends’ telepathic abilities are not compatible with their society’s 
understanding of the world or its tightly defined social and religious norms. They are 
“deviations” from the Waknuk dream of purity, which places strict requirements on 
knowledge claims to fit within an existing order of what is “known,” circumscribing how 
and what people can inquire about the world by terming original ideas heretical. David’s 
Uncle Axel, an unorthodox man sympathetic to his nephew’s plight, risks quoting to David 
from a journal banned for heresy which offers an alternative theory of the relationship of 
                                                      
7 Indeed, the similarities are so marked that critics including Aldiss (1973: 294); and Bleiler (1982: 221) 
have mistaken the setting for New England. Rowland Wymer, meanwhile, points to significant 
similarities between The Chrysalids and Arthur Miller’s 1953 play The Crucible (1992: 29). 
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the inhabited areas of Newfoundland to the “badlands” seen by passing ships which are “a 
kind of jungle of Deviations” (Wyndham, 1958: 59) and “The Black Coasts… [which] are 
entirely barren, and in some regions known to glow dimly on a dark night” (60-61). The 
journal’s author, Marther, implies that “deviations, so far from being a curse, were 
performing, however slowly, a work of reclamation. Along with half a dozen more heresies 
it landed Marther in court, and started agitation for a ban on further exploration” (61).  
 Marther’s work is threatening because in inverting existing understandings of the 
world it undermines the precarious stability of Waknuk. But like the early modern Church 
which serves as Wyndham’s analogue, Waknuk cannot be wholly successful in crushing 
heterodox inquiry because, as with the Nazi Empire in Swastika Night, their view of the 
past is too full of mystery and they lack the state apparatus of the properly modern, 
totalitarian regimes of Huxley’s World State and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. The 
invasive capabilities of the modern state are necessary to prevent citizens from learning 
how to enquire more successfully about the world – particularly in relation to the past and 
historical change. According to their orthodox beliefs, Waknuk knows next to nothing about 
what occurred before the holocaust they term “the Tribulations”: 
 
there was no telling how many generations of people had passed their 
lives like savages between the coming of Tribulation and the start of 
recorded history… the past, further back than three recorded centuries, 
was a long oblivion. Out of that blankness stretched a few strands of 
legend, badly frayed in their passage through successive minds 
(Wyndham 1958: 39). 
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The Chrysalids here provides an interesting counterpoint to other dystopian novels as the 
demolition of the future-as-past is not – as far as the reader can establish – an intentional 
achievement of the hegemonic power, but rather the necessary corollary of the total 
destruction of the author’s present. Moreover, the reader can immediately infer greater 
knowledge about the reason for this destruction than the characters in the story could ever 
know themselves: the story is littered with indirect references to a nuclear holocaust. 
 Within the storyworld, the primary means by which the past is explored (and through 
which something approaching future history is generated) is two religious texts: the Bible 
and a book written several hundred years after the Tribulations called “Nicholson’s 
Repentances.” The insular, inward-facing society is based, ironically, on a mutant form of 
Christianity. As such, knowledge is generated primarily through custom, tradition and 
myth. The community’s religious “knowledge” is linked to fears for survival in a brutal 
realm of contaminated nature. The past is magical, a time of divine forces and wild, 
uncontrollable powers. Their catechism “Blessed is the norm” is a call to praise the known 
and therefore controllable, in a chaotic, largely unknowable world beyond human control. 
Unlike the all-powerful regimes of Zamyatin’s, Orwell’s and Huxley’s dystopias, the 
patriarchs of Waknuk cannot ultimately control access to the “long oblivion” of the past: 
they instead try to present it through post-apocalyptic religious myths, and to suppress 
alternative means of historical inquiry. But without the communication systems of a modern 
state, this attempt to crush all heresy is destined to failure.  
 David learns at school that 
 
The world… was generally thought to be a pretty big place, and 
probably round.  The civilized part of it… was called Labrador… 
Round most of Labrador there was a great deal of water called 
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the sea, which was important on account of fish. Nobody that I 
knew, except Uncle Axel, had actually seen this sea because it 
was a long way off, but if you were to go three hundred miles or 
so east, north, or north-west you would come to it sooner or later. 
But south-west or south, you wouldn’t; you’d get to the Fringes 
and then the Badlands, which would kill you (Wyndham 1958: 
38-39). 
 
The deadly, blackened Badlands are obviously sites of nuclear explosions. Similarly, the 
“deviations” that Waknuk decries as impurities are genetic mutations whose prevalence can 
be attributed to high levels of radioactivity. But, as with the other dystopias discussed 
earlier, few details are provided. The narrator’s rudimentary schooling, as expressed in his 
view that the sea is “important on account of fish,” gives the reader little inkling of the 
process of catastrophic reversal through which the future comes to resemble the remote 
past. The events of the future-as-past remain shrouded. 
 Significantly, the telepathic youngsters learn no more about the past from “the 
Sealand woman.” “Sealand” (New Zealand), a country full of telepaths, retains at least 
some twentieth-century technology such as the aeroplane in which the telepaths are rescued, 
in addition to advanced weaponry. Yet the telepaths are also unable to achieve a 
comprehensive account of the thousand years comprising the future-as-past. Whilst the 
technology of these city-dwellers indicates a firm link to the pre-Tribulations past, the 
Sealand woman does not contradict Waknuk Tribulations mythology. On the contrary, her 
social Darwinist belief that the telepaths represent the dawn of “homo superior” (Wyndham 
1962) is cast in terms of a succession in which the Tribulations retain their mythical 
importance. 
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War, History and the future-as-past 
The contents of dystopian future histories are partially hidden from view. Under the guise 
of contested historical knowledge, unknown elements of the future-as-past hide as if 
redacted in black marker pen. As with any redaction, the very act of hiding foregrounds the 
created space as an anomaly in the text. Unknown elements are thereby invested with the 
mystery and power of taboo. 
 From Zamyatin’s We onwards, the most important event of the future-as-past in the 
texts I have discussed is a catastrophic war (the Two Hundred Years war in We, the Twenty 
Years’ War of Brave New World, the Nine Years’ War of Swastika Night, the continual 
conflict from 1948-1984 in Orwell’s dystopia, and the nuclear conflict in The Chrysalids). 
All of these texts feature a conflict so traumatic and damaging that it is impossible to 
reconstruct a full history. 
 Forster’s text stands alone as one that celebrates the physicality of war. In the final 
apocalyptic scene, The Machine breaks down irrevocably, killing an undifferentiated mass 
of people. Vashti and Kuno’s deaths are singled out from the lifeless bodies around them as 
glorious. As Kuno declares, “we die, but we have recaptured life, as it was in Wessex, when 
Aelfrid overthrew the Danes” (1954: 146). Interestingly, this is the same legend which the 
character Alfred in Swastika Night cites in opposition to Nazi rule. But while Alfred’s 
historical investigations reveal to him the problematic potential of myths to play a role in 
cementing cultural imperialism and inequality, Kuno celebrates the myth of “Aelfrid” 
unreflectively, as the marker of a romantic and recoverable past. For Kuno, dying in the 
death of the Machine is an active means of participating in a greater cultural death through 
which the “nobility” of humankind may be recovered, and life itself re-invigorated.  
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 Dystopian fiction is always extrapolative, but the positing of an imagined future 
involves leaving out crucial details concerning the future-as-past. The presence of these 
gaps and omissions invites the reader to participate in the reconstruction of future histories 
which can never be complete. Knowledge of both contextual and historical issues on the 
one hand and generic conventions on the other is necessary to this process of 
reconstruction. If dystopian fiction is, as Tom Moylan puts it, “largely the product of the 
terrors of the twentieth century” (2000: xi) then the narrative strategies I have discussed 
involve the reader as an active participant in thinking through some of the implications of 
these terrors. The gaps and omissions also enable the texts’ engagement with contemporary 
issues to have meaning beyond the narrowly predictive, and to demonstrate that the cultural 
fears and anxieties which they map in relation to the future are a result of both the known 
and the unknown in the present. 
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